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Abstract:
This project explores the relation between the magnitude of the cooperative sector and
the degree of income inequality in a country. After a somewhat selective consideration of the
possible linkages between the size of the cooperative sector and income inequality, and using
Gini as the primary measure for income inequality and two proxies for the size of the cooperative
sector, an empirical exploration is done in three ways. First, simple plots are used to judge the
gross relation between Gini and each of the two proxies for the size of the cooperative sector.
Both plots show a perceptible negative relation. Second, simple regressions of Gini are run on
each measure of the cooperative sector to obtain quantitative correlates of the plots. The
regression estimates show a highly significant negative relation between each proxy for the
cooperative sector and Gini. Third, a more extended regression model is estimated after adding
several control variables that have been suggested to affect income inequality. While estimated
coefficients for the cooperative proxies continue to have negative signs in the extended model,
their statistical significance is somewhat eroded relative to the conventional significance levels.
Two other measures of income inequality show an even more perceptible negative association
between income inequality and the cooperative sector size. While the multiple regression
estimates indicate most control variables to lack statistical significance, mean years of school has
a highly significant negative association with Gini, which is an informative outcome of the work.
The estimates also show a significant positive association between both unemployment rate and
natural resource endowment with the Gini coefficient. The main message from the study seems
to be that, despite a low statistical significance in some of the regressions, there is considerable
evidence of an inequality-attenuating role of the size of the cooperative sector in an economy.
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Introduction:
The subject of worker-owned cooperatives is important and timely because there are
significant welfare implications for individuals who work in cooperatives compared to traditional
firms. Benefits to cooperative member ownership often include, but are not limited to, increased
job security, a smaller earnings gap between the highest and lowest paid worker in an
organization, empowerment through economic democracy (one member-one vote), and possibly
higher average wages (Perotin 2014; Arando et al. 2011). The motivation for this project is to
potentially contribute to an important policy debate surrounding social welfare and income
inequality in nations. Social democrats traditionally argue that social welfare programs and
government redistribution are ideal to address income inequality. Neoliberals, on the other hand,
traditionally argue that limited government and tax cuts for firms to encourage private sector
growth is the path to prosperity and reduced income inequality. Worker cooperatives may
represent a way to bridge these two opposing viewpoints and help individuals across the political
spectrum find common ground. The research question this study seeks to address is the
following: Is an expanded scope or size of the cooperative sector in a country associated with
reduced income inequality?
The initial hypothesis is that there is an inverse relationship between the prevalence of
cooperatives in a country and income inequality. Therefore, I predict that if the cooperative
economy grows in a country, the income inequality should be lower, all else held constant. This
postulate is based on existing concepts related to cooperatives. Cooperative worker-members are
empowered through economic democracy which gives them greater decision-making power than
they would otherwise possess in traditional firms (Perotin 2014; pp.41-42). Additionally,
workers benefit from the unique distributive nature of the cooperative organizational structure
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which provides them with greater ownership over the means of production. This means workers
are entitled to a share of the profits earned by the firm, often credited to individual capital
accounts (Arando et al. 2011; p.9). I would expect that a larger number of firms with a
cooperative character would result in lower income inequality in society.
Background and Literature Review:
Section 1: Worker Cooperatives
Cooperatives vs. Traditional Firms:
The worker-owned cooperative organizational structure is one that has garnered a fair
amount of attention over the years. Though interest in cooperatives has grown in recent years,
the topic is certainly nothing new. In fact, the famed English economist and philosopher John
Stuart Mill (1806-1873) amazingly wrote “The form of association, however, which if mankind
continue to improve, must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that which can exist
between a capitalist as chief, and work-people without a voice in the management, but the
association of the laborers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with
which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable by
themselves” (Mill 1848; p.199). The reasoning behind this prediction is plausible. One study
argues that this prediction should occur due to (1) productivity advantages over traditional
capitalist rivals, (2) a survival rate and profitability that is “no worse, and possibly better” than
traditional firms, and (3) democratic features that workers value (Schwartz 2012; p.267). If
cooperatives truly possess these advantages, and if this claim is supported by empirical evidence,
then why did Mill’s prediction remain unrealized? Schwartz (2012; pp.267-268) provides two
explanations: (1) A labor-managed firm is a public good and therefore may suffer from the “freerider” problem whereby collective action tends to produce suboptimal outcomes and (2)
cooperatives are relatively unknown to the broader community that includes workers, investors,
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and lenders. This reasoning implies that the scarcity of cooperatives relative to traditional firms
does not lie in any inherent inferiority of the cooperative organizational structure itself, but rather
that cooperatives are less likely to be created in the first place. The author explains that the
market will not generally “grow” cooperatives because they share the attributes of public goods
(Schwartz 2012; p.283). Schwartz argues that strong sources of institutional support such as
unions or governmental bodies should be utilized to create the public good of cooperatives.
Collective action problems are often addressed by utilizing an institutional authority with the
power to change the incentive structure in a society, through either coercive or non-coercive
means (Schwartz 2012; p.283). An important question to ask, of course, is if such a policy should
be pursued by governments. Should some sort of action be taken to promote the creation and
growth of a cooperative economy? Perhaps an argument could be made for this if the benefits to
society outweigh the costs from intervening in the market.
Member Ownership and Democratic Governance:
Worker cooperatives have a unique organizational structure that empowers workers
through both (1) member ownership and (2) democratic governance. This makes cooperatives
distinctly different from traditional firms which generally give workers little (if any) ownership
stake in the firm or effective voice in the firm management. Some traditional capitalist firms
provide employees with an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) which gives workers
ownership stake through shares of company stock (Zeuli & Radel 2005; p.46). However, this
does not make the firm a worker cooperative unless the economic democracy component is
included as well. Economic democracy is the idea that worker-members should be given an
equal voice in the decision-making progress. This is usually accomplished through the “onemember-one-vote” principle common in cooperatives rather than the “one-dollar-one vote”
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principle found in traditional firms (Johanisova and Wolf 2012; p.565). One-member-one vote
implies that every cooperative member has an equal voice in the decision-making process.
Therefore, unlike the traditional firms, those who own more equity shares do not have more
decision-making power. As an added measure of protection, cooperatives usually have an upper
limit to the ownership stake that any one member can possess (Johanisova and Wolf 2012;
p.565). Here is a table that conveniently explains the differences between a traditional firm and a
cooperative firm:
Type:

Worker Cooperative:

Traditional Firm:

Ownership:

Worker-members collectively
own means of production
through “ownership stake”
acquired over time and thus
entitled to share of firm
profits.

External shareholders (those
who own company stock)
own the means of production
and thus receive profits.

Decision-Making Power:

Generally “one-member-onevote”. Often a “Board of
Directors” is elected directly
by worker-members who
carry out executive decisions
on behalf of worker-members
(similar to a representative
democracy).

Generally “one-dollar-onevote”. Decision-making
power belongs to corporate
managers/executives working
for external shareholders
(employees have little input
on executive decisions at firm
level).

It is important to note that not every employee of a cooperative is necessarily considered
a “worker-member/worker-owner”. Quite often workers are required to “buy-in” to become full
cooperative members. For example, worker-members of the Eroski group of cooperatives in the
Mondragon Corporation, a federation of worker cooperatives based in the Basque region of
Spain, are required to make a substantial initial capital contribution of approximately 6000 euros
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(Arando et al. 2011; p.7). Over time, however, individual stakes in the cooperative grow as
distributions from surpluses are credited to individual capital accounts. For example, the average
stake in the Eroski Group hypermarket cooperatives is 33,295 euros and the average stake is
comparable in the supermarket cooperatives at over 26,000 euros (Arando et al. 2011; p.7). This
is significant as it demonstrates that cooperatives have the potential to reduce in the long run
wealth inequality as well. Though this is just one example of a cooperative, studies show that
members generally contribute between 30 and 50 percent of the total capital required to finance
the cooperative (Zeuli & Radel 2005; p.44).
This does not mean there are not negative aspects to democratic governance though. One
study found that collective interest is often difficult (i.e. costly) to determine and worker
members may have to be sufficiently homogenous along a variety of dimensions in order to
arrive at agreeable decisions and policies (Pencavel 2012; p.28). In essence, the study found that
a homogenous workforce is preferred. However, it recognizes that “others have suggested that
heterogeneous decision-makers make better decisions when faced with complex problems”
(Pencavel 2012; p.28). Therefore, a tradeoff may exist when deciding whether or not to employ a
more homogenous workforce or membership.
Productivity and Efficiency:
Any serious discussion on cooperatives will include a section on the productivity and
efficiency of cooperatives compared to traditional firms. Even though this study is
predominantly about the nexus between the size of the cooperative sector and income inequality,
it is important to consider whether the cooperative organizational structure is both economically
competitive and efficient. If this were not the case, and they truly were suboptimal compared to
traditional firms, it would be difficult to argue for them as a potential strategy to address income
7

inequality. Doucouliagos (1995; p.73) performed a meta-analysis study using data from 34
studies on worker participation and productivity in cooperatives and participatory capitalist
firms. The results indicated that democratic governance and various forms of worker
participation in decision-making do not hinder productivity. Additionally, the author found that
profit sharing is more positively related to productivity than worker participation in decisionmaking. Another study which used panel data on several thousand French firms found that
cooperatives organize their production differently from traditional firms which allows them to
use their capital and labor more effectively than traditional firms (Fakhfakh et al. 2013; pp.1718). They also found that contrary to popular belief, cooperatives are not necessarily smaller than
traditional firms when measured by number of employees. Though they found that cooperatives
are smaller on average when measured by level of capital, no evidence seems to suggest they are
“under-capitalized” or suffer from “capital starvation” or under-investment (Fakhfakh et al.
2013; pp.15-16). Lastly, they found that cooperatives are “at least as productive as conventional
firms” and grow “at least as fast as conventional firms in all the industries studied” (Fakhfakh et
al. 2013; p.2). Finally, we return to the study conducted on the Eroski group of cooperatives in
the Mondragon Corporation in Spain. Using data on hypermarkets and supermarkets from 2006
to 2008, the authors determined that hypermarket cooperative stores grew faster than comparable
hypermarket GESPA stores. GESPA stores are defined as stores with modest employee
ownership but limited voice (similar to ESOP). The growth rate advantage was approximately
2.4 percentage points per year (Arando et al. 2011; p.20). They also performed a similar analysis
on cooperative supermarket stores compared to conventional supermarket stores. They found a
growth rate advantage of a considerable 8.4 percentage points per year for the “Supermarket
City” subgroup of cooperative supermarket stores compared to conventional stores (Arando et al.
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2011; p.21). This is a sizable advantage and indicates that under certain conditions, cooperatives
have the potential to grow faster than conventional firms.
Worker Outcomes and Wellbeing:
The cooperative organizational structure is unique in that it seeks to maximize worker
outcomes and wellbeing rather than profits necessarily. This means cooperative firms seek to be
income-maximizing rather than profit-maximizing. For the typical capitalist firm, the well-being
of its workers may be achieved only as a by-product of the firm’s profit-maximizing activities.
However, for a cooperative firm, the well-being of its worker-members is often a distinct and
categorical goal set by the organization itself (Pencavel 2012; p.9). In other words, “the masterservant relation that predates the employer-employee association in the capitalist firm is replaced
in the co-op by one of self-employment and the democratic determination of issues” (Pencavel
2012; p.9). Despite the fact that cooperatives are income-maximizing, wages in cooperatives are
often more responsive to product market shocks while employment is generally less responsive
(Pencavel et al. 2006; p.28). Capitalist firms will typically take wages as a given while adjusting
various firm inputs including capital and employment. Cooperatives, on the other hand, strive to
minimize the negative impact on employment by varying wages (Pencavel et al. 2006; p.28).
This is to be expected considering that cooperative members typically command a greater voice
which can protect them from employment reductions (Pencavel et al. 2006; p.42). Another study
found similar results and concluded that worker cooperatives tend to choose employment
stability (job preservation) over income stability when responding to market shocks (Perotin
2014; p.43). There seems to be a consensus in the literature that cooperatives behave in this
manner when faced with shocks and uncertainty.
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In the Eroski group of the Mondragon Corporation in Spain, it was determined that the
internal wage differences between cooperative employees were significantly compressed with a
ratio of incomes from top to bottom that did not exceed 5 to 1 (Arando et al. 2011; p.8).
Furthermore, they found that cooperative members in non-managerial positions receive at least
20% higher wages than their outside counterparts. As expected, this is accompanied by the fact
that top managers tend to receive much lower wages than their conventional retail store manager
counterparts. Their wages are estimated to be about 30% lower than outside rates (Arando et al.
2011; p.8). This finding is important for assessing worker outcomes and wellbeing. Another
study actually found conflicting results when using data on cooperative firms in Italy between
1982 and 1994. This study concluded that cooperative firms provided 14% lower wages than
capitalist firms, all else held equal (Pencavel et al. 2006; p.36). There is need for additional
research on this topic.
Resiliency and Community Impact:
Evidence from the 2007-2008 global recession indicates that cooperatives are remarkably
resilient in times of crisis and upheaval. Germany is a country with over 8000 cooperatives
which collectively have around 20 million members. During the height of the recession in 2008,
there were around 250 cooperatives started, double the numbers started in 2007 (Birchall &
Ketilson 2009; p.29). Furthermore, cooperatives tend to have greater survivability than
traditional firms. Approximately 1% of businesses in Germany in 2005 were declared insolvent
compared to less than 0.1% for cooperatives (Birchall & Ketilson 2009; p.29). Similar statistics
can be found around the world. For example, in Quebec and Canada in general, 6 out of 10
cooperatives survive more than 5 years compared to 4 out of 10 traditional firms. When
extending the timeframe to 10 years, researchers found that more than 4 out of 10 cooperatives
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survive compared to just 2 out of 10 traditional firms (Birchall & Ketilson 2009; pp.29-30). Part
of this longevity is explained by the fact that “cooperatives are not purely motivated by
achieving the maximum rate of profit” (Birchall & Ketilson 2009; p.30). They often have other
goals such as meeting the needs of their members and serving their community (Birchall &
Ketilson 2009; p.30).
Finally, it is important to consider cooperatives within the context of the communities in
which they operate. Cooperatives represent a significant and often overlooked tool for
community development. Greater employment stability over the long run results in more resilient
communities. The sustainable (resilient) jobs created by cooperatives are likely to have positive
consequences for the communities in which they operate (Perotin 2014; p.43). These positive
externalities include a reduction in the use of both unemployment benefits and social services in
the community and a sustainable source of tax revenue from continuous employment (Perotin
2014; p.42). This is additional evidence that supports the view that cooperatives are not only
beneficial for individual members, but that they can be treated as a public good to some extent.
Cooperatives represent an important way to incorporate frequently marginalized groups
(such as women) into decision-making processes. Women are often excluded from leadership
positions, but evidence from various countries suggests that firm profit is positively correlated
with greater representation of women in important leadership positions (Smith & Rothbaum
2013; p.11). Other studies have shown that child health and education outcomes in communities
improve when women control a larger share of income or assets (Smith & Rothbaum 2013;
p.11). Cooperatives are also important for building social capital in communities. When
cooperative members are engaged in democratic decision-making processes, they gain valuable
skills and experience that they can take to other areas such as civil society (Smith & Rothbaum
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2013; p.3). This is an example of how cooperatives can build social capital in communities
around the world.
Section 2: Income Inequality
Measuring Inequality (Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient):
A significant amount of economics literature exists on the topic of income inequality. An
important pioneering contributor to this area is Max Lorenz of the University of Wisconsin.
Lorenz (1905) developed a method for visualizing distributions of wealth or income to show
inherent inequality or “concentration” in a society (Kleiber 2007; p.2). This has come to be
known as the Lorenz curve. In essence, the Lorenz curve “plots the cumulative share of total
income against the cumulative proportion of income-receiving units" (Heshmati 2004; p.2). This
curve is useful because it can generate what is known as the Gini coefficient. The Gini
coefficient is a measure of the amount of inequality in the income distribution. It can be
calculated by finding the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality and
dividing this by the area below the line of perfect equality (Heshmati 2004; p.2). Here is a
graphical representation:

Source: (Heshmati 2004; p.14)
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In this representation the 45-degree straight line represents the line of perfect equality. It
represents perfect equality and thus zero income inequality in a society (country). As the
cumulative income-share curve approaches the line of perfect equality, income inequality
decreases and the Gini coefficient becomes smaller. Alternatively, as the cumulative incomeshare curve moves further away from the line of perfect equality, income inequality increases
and the Gini coefficient becomes larger. Thus a larger Gini coefficient represents a greater
amount of inequality in society. The Gini coefficient is usually measured as a ratio between 0
and 1, but can also be represented as a percentage from 0 to 100. For the purposes of this study,
the Gini coefficient will be measured as a percentage. It is important to note that inequality can
be measured relative to income, health, happiness, opportunities, education, skills, and wealth,
among others (Heshmati 2004; p.1). This study will focus primarily on income inequality. Now
that the measurement of income inequality has been defined, it is important to discuss why
income inequality is important and the trends that have been occurring over time.
Developments in Poverty and Income Inequality:
Income inequality is critical to examine from both a community development and
academic perspective. From a community development perspective, it is important simply
because its negative effects are experienced at the community level. Research indicates that
income inequality is a problem that exacts high social costs across all income groups and is
positively correlated with factors such as: teen pregnancy, mental illness, drug use, crime, poor
educational performance, obesity, and lower life expectancy (Choi 2011; p.3). Additionally,
rising income inequality is linked to both lower levels of civic engagement and social capital in
communities. Income inequality disproportionately affects those from low and moderate income
(LMI) communities. For this reason, addressing widening income inequality is ultimately about
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“helping LMI communities reach their full potential, thereby improving their capacity to
participate in and contribute to the broader economy” (Choi 2011; p.7). From this perspective it
is easy to see that addressing income inequality not only benefits those on the lower end of the
income spectrum, but everyone who participates in the local economy as a whole.
The study of poverty and income inequality from an academic perspective has changed
considerably since the 1970’s. One major development is that the context in which inequality
and poverty is studied has drastically changed over time. Essentially this means that prevalence
of inequality and poverty look very different now than they did 40 years ago in various parts of
the world (Jenkins & Micklewright 2007; pp.2-5). Other developments include changes in both
analytical methods of measurement and quantity and quality of data available. This includes the
“immense cross-fertilization” which has occurred between income inequality measurement and
other related measures such as mobility, poverty, and social welfare (Jenkins & Micklewright
2007; pp.10-16). Finally, there have been significant changes in the policy environments in both
developed and developing nations. Two of these changes include the expansion of the European
Union (EU) and the introduction of global initiatives such as the U.N. Millennium Development
Goals (Jenkins & Micklewright 2007; pp.5-6).
Lastly, it is important to note that income inequality is a major issue that is truly global in
scope. In fact, “global inequality is much greater than inequality within any individual country”
(Milanovic 2014; p.10). The global Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality that
incorporates every nation and every individual on earth, is calculated to be around 0.7 or 70%
(Milanovic 2014; p.10). This is actually greater than the highest income inequality (0.643 or
63.4%) seen in any of the 66 individual countries covered in this study. The global Gini
coefficient, though not particularly important for the purposes of this study, is something to keep
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in mind considering that income inequality is an issue that we all face as a global community of
individuals and nations.
Determinants of Income Inequality:
Literature on the determinants of income inequality is generally broken into two
categories: single country and multi-country studies. For example, one multi-country study tested
the economic and other determinants of income inequality using a panel dataset consisting of 81
countries and 5-year averages from 1962-2006. The author concluded that there is no evidence
that democracy is linked to higher or lower income inequality. Ultimately, economic
determinants of income inequality were seen to be more important than political ones (Nikoloski
2009; p.38). A variety of economic determinants were found significant including: natural
resource endowment, industrialization and economic growth, financial sector development, and
trade openness. Income inequality was positively correlated with natural resource endowment
and financial sector development. It was negatively correlated with both industrialization and
economic growth and trade openness (Nikoloski 2009; pp.29-31). Another multi-country study
used a panel dataset consisting of 97 countries and 5-year averages from 1980-2012. The authors
concluded that financial openness, technological progress, and less regulated labor markets were
generally associated with higher income inequality. Government redistributive spending was
found to be associated with lower income inequality (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; p.26). Financial
deepening (larger financial sector) was positively correlated with income inequality in countries
with low levels of financial inclusion such as developing countries (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015;
p.23).
A single country study for Iran was conducted using time series data from 1976 to 2010.
This study found GDP growth rate, ratio of government current expenditure, and ratio of oil
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revenue to GDP to be positively correlated with income inequality (Mehrara & Mohammadian
2015; p.27). A single country study for South Korea utilizing time series data from 1980 to 2012
found GDP per capita squared, share of elderly in working population, trade openness, and
unemployment as positively correlated with income inequality. It also found inflation, growth of
agricultural production, share of middle school students in school-age population, and share of
investment in total GDP to be negatively correlated with income inequality. GDP growth and the
share of government spending in GDP had no effect (Lee et al. 2013; pp.102-104).
Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Model:
Simple economic theory will be utilized to determine the appropriate theoretical
framework for this study. Many studies have been conducted on the topic of income inequality in
a variety of contexts. These studies used economic theory to determine which variables might be
most suitable as determinants of income inequality. It is important to understand the variables
that other studies have used as determinants of income inequality in order to construct an
appropriate model for this study. The vast majority of studies in this area use the Gini coefficient
as the dependent variable. The potential determinants in question then serve as the independent
variables in the empirical model. A variety of empirical methods are then utilized (depending on
a variety of factors including type of data used) to ultimately conclude which determinants are
significant and which ones are not. The statistically significant variables are said to be important
determinants of income inequality, while the variables that are not statistically significant are not
considered to be determinants of income inequality. This study will follow a similar format
where the Gini coefficient will be used as the dependent variable. The independent variables will
then be the two main variables of interest that pertain to cooperatives along with the selected
important determinants of income inequality, which have been chosen based on the single and
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multi-country studies outlined in the literature review. It is important to note that results often
differed between studies relative to the variables found significant. Sometimes economic theory
would indicate that certain variables were important while empirical analysis indicated
something different. Therefore, it is useful to consider a wide range of variables based on both
economic theory and empirical results from previous studies. The next section outlines a simple
empirical model this study will utilize.
Empirical Model:
GINI = β0 + β1COOP_GDP + β2COOP_MEMB + β3NAT_RES + β4GDP_GROW + β5LGDPPC
+ β6UNEMP + β7 TRAD_OPEN + β8INFL_CPI + β9GOV_EXP + β10FIN_DEV + β11LEDUC +
β12FIN_OPEN + e
Where:















GINI = income Gini coefficient measured as a %
COOP_GDP = cooperative turnover as a % of GDP
COOP_MEMB = % of population with cooperative membership
NAT_RES = natural resource endowment proxied by total natural resource rents as % of
GDP
GDP_GROW = annual GDP growth as a %
LGDPPC = log of GDP per capita, PPP (current international dollars)
UNEMP = unemployment rate (measured as a %)
TRAD_OPEN = trade openness determined by sum of exports and imports as a % of GDP
INFL_CPI = inflation rate (%) based on consumer price index (CPI)
GOV_EXP = general government final consumption expenditure as a % of GDP
FIN_DEV = financial development determined by domestic credit to private sector as %
of GDP
LEDUC = log of mean number of years of education of adult population
FIN_OPEN = financial openness determined by net foreign assets as % of GDP
e = error term

Expected Variable Signs:
Economic theory would indicate certain relationships between the dependent variable and
various independent variables in the model. Considering the positive attributes associated with the
cooperative organizational structure, I expect a negative relationship between GINI and both
17

COOP_GDP and COOP_MEMB. The literature indicates a positive relationship between income
inequality and natural resource endowment (Nikoloski 2009; p.4). Next, as GDP growth increases
I can expect a lower GINI coefficient (Nikoloski 2009; pp.6-7). Though many studies find
conflicting results, the overall view seems to be that there is a positive relationship between income
inequality and GDP per capita in the short run and a negative relationship in the long run
(Nikoloski 2009; pp.5-6). A positive relationship generally exists between income inequality and
unemployment rate (Lee et al. 2013; p.104). There seems to be inconclusive evidence in the
literature regarding the relationship between income inequality and trade openness. Some studies
find positive relationships while others find negative relationships. However, it is generally
accepted that as international trade flows (trade openness) increase, inequality decreases
(Nikoloski 2009; pp.7-8). Next, I find that CPI inflation has a negative relationship with income
inequality. This is because it often acts as a “progressive tax in that the poor and middle classes
lose relatively less than the rich” (Blinder and Esaki 1978 cited by Lee et al. 2013; p.103).
Literature indicates that increased government redistributive spending decreases income inequality
(Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; p.26). Differing results have been found regarding the relationship
between financial deepening or financial sector development and income inequality. However,
there generally seems to be a positive correlation between income inequality and financial sector
development, especially among countries with low levels of financial inclusion (Nikoloski 2009;
pp.29-31 & Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; p.23). Level of education, measured by years of schooling,
is generally correlated with lower income inequality. This is because as more individuals in a
country receive education, the return to education declines, which reduces income inequality
(Gregorio & Lee 2002; p.397). Lastly, financial openness is correlated with higher income
inequality (Dabla-Norris et al. 2015; p.20).
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Variable:

Expected Sign:

COOP_GDP

Negative (-)

COOP_MEMB

Negative (-)

NAT_RES

Positive (+)

GDP_GROW

Negative (-)

LGDPPC

Positive (+) in short run / Negative (-) in long run

UNEMP

Positive (+)

TRAD_OPEN

Negative (-)

INFL_CPI

Negative (-)

GOV_EXP

Negative (-)

FIN_DEV

Positive (+)

LEDUC

Negative (-)

FIN_OPEN

Positive (+)

Data:
Data on cooperatives comes from the 2014 Global Census on Cooperatives Dataset
compiled by the consulting firm Dave Grace and Associates for the United Nations Secretariat
Department of Economic and Social Affairs. This new dataset published in April 2014 was the
first serious attempt to quantify the size and magnitude of the cooperative economy in countries
around the world. It was first published in a report entitled: Measuring the Size and Scope of the
Cooperative Economy: Results of the 2014 Global Census on Co-operatives (Dave Grace &
Associates 2014). Data on the GINI coefficient (measured as a percentage) for the countries in the
study comes from the World Bank and the CIA World Factbook. Data on the GINI coefficient for
some of the 66 countries could not be found for the year 2014. Therefore, the most recent GINI
data was used in substitution of 2014 data in such cases. All of the variables used 2014 data when
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available, but in a few instances it was necessary to use the most recent data available. Considering
the high correlation between a variable and its past lags, this should have little effect on the results.
The data is cross-sectional because there is only one year available for the Global Census on
Cooperatives dataset. Only 66 countries in the dataset had data availability for both cooperative
turnover as a % of GDP and % of population with cooperative membership. I wanted to use the
same set of countries for each cooperative sector proxy variable in order to obtain the most
consistent results possible. All of the data in the study was gathered directly from various sources
except for variable FIN_OPEN. This variable had to be constructed using data on both net foreign
assets and GDP measured in the current local currency in 2014 from the World Bank. This data
allowed me to construct net foreign assets as a percentage of GDP for 2014, a measure of financial
openness. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the main variables.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics:
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Methodology:
The methodology for this analysis consists of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. This
estimation technique was chosen primarily due to the fact that the study uses cross-sectional data
for a single year rather than time-series or panel data that spans multiple years. For ordinary least
squares estimation to be appropriate, a number of assumptions must be satisfied. The first of these
is that the true population relationship is linear in parameters. The second is that I have access to
a random sample of observations from the population. The third assumption is that there is no
perfect collinearity. This means there is no perfect correlation between the regressors. Another
assumption is that the error term has an expected value of zero for all possible values of the
independent (explanatory) variables. The fifth OLS assumption is that there is at least some sample
variation in each of the explanatory variables. Under these five assumptions I can state that the
OLS estimators obtained are unbiased and consistent. A sixth assumption that can be tested is the
homoscedasticity assumption. This states that the variance of the error term is constant across all
values of the explanatory variables. This assumption is necessary for the OLS estimators to be
efficient. The last assumption I must make in order to perform statistical inferences and hypothesis
tests is the normality assumption. This assumption states that the error term is normally distributed
(with a mean of zero and variance of  2 ). Finally, the regressors are treated as exogenous. Since I
assume the requisite OLS assumptions hold, my statistical analysis and results should be reliable.1

White’s (1980) test indicates absence of heteroscedasticity in the models. The White test
computed a chi^2 value of approximately 66. This resulted in a p-value of 0.4421 which is
greater than 0.05. Since it does not fall within the rejection region, I fail to reject the null
hypothesis of constant variance. Therefore, I assume that there is homoscedasticity and that usual
OLS standard errors are sufficient for statistical testing. Robust standard errors are not necessary
unless heteroscedasticity is present.
1
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Analysis and Results:
A. Graphical Analysis:
I begin with an initial graphical analysis to obtain a visual representation of the relationship
between the Gini index and both cooperative turnover as % of GDP and % of population with
cooperative membership. The relation is shown in Figure 1a and Figure 1b. Both indicate a slight
downward, negatively sloped relationship between the Gini coefficient and each of the two
independent variables of primary interest.
Figure 1a. Relationship between Gini Index (%) and Cooperative Turnover as a % of GDP:

Gini Index (%) and Cooperative Turnover as a % of GDP
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Figure 1b. Relationship between Gini Index (%) and % of Population with Cooperative
Membership:

Gini Index (%) and % Population with Cooperative
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B. Simple Regression Results:
The estimates of simple regressions of GINI on COOP_GDP and COOP_MEMB are
shown in Table 2. The results for the simple regression of COOP_GDP with GINI indicate that a
10 percentage point increase in COOP_GDP decreases the Gini coefficient by 7.81 percentage
points. Now considering the average cooperative turnover as % of GDP is a mere 3 percent, a 10
percentage point increase in this variable is very large. Nonetheless, even a one percentage point
increase would result in a decrease in the Gini coefficient by 0.781 percentage points, which is still
significant. Simple regression results of COOP_MEMB on GINI indicate that a 10 percentage
point increase in COOP_MEMB decreases the Gini coefficient by 0.627 percentage points. The
magnitude of this effect is smaller. The coefficient on COOP_GDP is statistically significant at
the 1% level, while the coefficient on COOP_MEMB is significant at better than the 5% level.
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Table 2. Simple Regressions of both COOP_GDP and COOP_MEMB with GINI:
Variable

COOP_GDP

COOP_MEMB

COOP_GDP

Coefficients
(t-value)
(p-value)
-0.781***
(-3.58)
(0.001)
N/A

Coefficients
(t-value)
(p-value)
N/A

COOP_MEMB

Constant

40.05
(34.04)
(0.000)
N = 66
R^2 = 0.1669
Adjusted R^2 = 0.154
Prob > F: 0.0007

-0.0627**
(-2.35)
(0.022)
39.40
(31.19)
(0.000)
N = 66
R^2 = 0.0792
Adjusted R^2 = 0.0648
Prob > F: 0.0221

C. Extended Regression Results
The extended regression estimates are shown in Table 3. The results for COOP_GDP
indicate there is not a statistically significant relationship between income inequality and
cooperative turnover as a percentage of overall GDP at the conventional significance levels. Since
the p-value is 0.13, the estimate is not statistically significant even at the 10% level. Before
incorporating the control variables there is statistical significance at the 1% level, but this
relationship dissipates when control variables are added. The sign is negative and has a magnitude
of approximately 0.401. This would be interpreted as a decrease in the Gini coefficient by 4.01
percentage points for a 10 percentage point increase in cooperative turnover as a percentage of
GDP. This is the result of a regression with an R-squared value of approximately 0.391 and 66
observations. The regression produced two statistically significant variables: UNEMP and
LEDUC. A positive correlation was found between UNEMP and GINI which was expected.
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Results indicate that a 10 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate increases the Gini
coefficient by 2.97 percentage points. A negative correlation was found between LEDUC and
GINI. The estimate indicates that a 10% increase in education decreases the Gini coefficient by
2.91 percentage points. Considering that the mean education level in this study is approximately
10.2 years of schooling, a 10% increase in education equates to roughly a year of schooling.
Therefore, an extra year of schooling is correlated with a decrease in the Gini coefficient by almost
3 percentage points.
Extended regression results for COOP_MEMB also indicate no statistically significant
relationship between income inequality and percentage of population with cooperative
membership. Regression results indicate a negative coefficient with a relatively small magnitude
of approximately 0.0277 and a p-value of 0.337. I found a positive coefficient with a magnitude
of 0.390 for variable NAT_RES. The variable is statistically significant at the 10% level and has
a sign that corresponds with the literature. This is interpreted as an increase in the Gini coefficient
by 3.90 percentage points for a 10 percentage point increase in total natural resource rents as a
percentage of GDP. This means that a greater natural resource endowment is correlated with higher
income inequality, all else held equal. UNEMP is positively correlated with income inequality and
has a magnitude of 0.314. It was statistically significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.077.
This positive relationship corresponds with economic theory. This result implies that a 10
percentage point increase in unemployment rate increases the Gini coefficient by 3.14 percentage
points. Logically it makes sense that a country with higher unemployment would also have higher
income inequality. The next variable, LEDUC, is the last statistically significant variable in the
results. This variable had a coefficient of -30.61 and was statistically significant at the 5% level
with a p-value of 0.044. The result can be interpreted as: a 10% increase in education results in a
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decrease in the Gini coefficient by 3.061 percentage points. In other words, an additional year of
education results in a decrease in the Gini coefficient by roughly 3 percentage points. This means
that higher education results in lower income inequality, which corresponds with the literature.
Table 3. Extended Regressions of both COOP_GDP and COOP_MEMB with GINI:
Variable

COOP_GDP

COOP_MEMB

COOP_GDP

Coefficients
(t-value)
(p-value)
-0.401
(-1.54)
(0.130)
N/A

Coefficients
(t-value)
(p-value)
N/A

COOP_MEMB

NAT_RES

GDP_GROW

LGDPPC

UNEMP

TRAD_OPEN

INFL_CPI

GOV_EXP

FIN_DEV

LEDUC

0.352
(1.61)
(0.113)
0.546
(1.19)
(0.240)
5.08
(0.850)
(0.398)
0.297*
(1.72)
(0.091)
-0.022
(-1.05)
(0.297)
0.129
(0.64)
(0.528)
-0.250
(-0.83)
(0.409)
0.0205
(0.920)
(0.361)
-29.06**
(-2.00)
(0.050)

-0.0277
(-0.97)
(0.337)
0.390*
(1.78)
(0.080)
0.445
(0.95)
(0.345)
5.270
0.84
(0.403)
0.314*
(1.80)
(0.077)
-0.0236
(-1.09)
(0.282)
0.134
(0.65)
(0.518)
-0.359
(-1.23)
(0.225)
0.0165
(0.74)
(0.464)
-30.61**
(-2.06)
(0.044)
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FIN_OPEN

Constant

0.00861
(0.570)
(0.568)
44.513
(2.450)
(0.018)
N = 66
R^2 = 0.391
Adjusted R^2 = 0.267
Prob > F: 0.0024

0.00696
(0.46)
(0.648)
47.11
(2.55)
(0.014)
N = 66
R^2 = 0.375
Adjusted R^2 = 0.248
Prob > F: 0.0041

D. Robustness Check:
Two other measures of income inequality besides the Gini coefficient were used to check
the robustness of my results. I wanted to see if the statistical significance of the cooperative sector
proxies was better using different measures of income inequality. These measures are: the ratio of
the average income of the richest 10% to the poorest 10% in a country and the ratio of the average
income of the richest 20% to the poorest 20% in a country. Data was collected on these ratios for
each of the 66 countries in the study. This data originated from the U.N. Human Development
Reports from 2007/2008 and 2009 (Appendix A). The ratios were then logged and defined as the
dependent variables LRP10 and LRP20. Using these new dependent variables, regressions were
run to see if there were significant results for the two main variables of interest and the estimates
are shown in Table 4 and Table 5. However, the new measures of income inequality,
COOP_MEMB and COOP_GDP were also not statistically significant at the conventional levels.
The results for LRP20 are more significant than those for LRP10, but never falls within the
commonly accepted range for statistical significance. The overall pattern for LRP10 and LRP20 is
very similar to that for GINI.
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Table 4. Extended Regressions of COOP_GDP and COOP_MEMB with LRP10:
Variable

COOP_GDP

COOP_MEMB

COOP_GDP

Coefficients
(t-value)
(p-value)
-0.0074
(-0.86)
(0.393)
N/A

Coefficients
(t-value)
(p-value)
N/A

COOP_MEMB

NAT_RES

GDP_GROW

LGDPPC

UNEMP

TRAD_OPEN

INFL_CPI

GOV_EXP

FIN_DEV

LEDUC

FIN_OPEN

Constant

0.0106
(1.47)
(0.147)
0.0188
(1.21)
(0.231)
0.322
(1.62)
(0.112)
0.00582
(1.00)
(0.322)
-0.000732
(-1.05)
(0.298)
0.00675
(1.02)
(0.315)
-0.00998
(-0.99)
(0.328)
0.000135
(0.18
(0.856)
-0.973**
(-2.04)
(0.047)
-0.000111
(-0.22)
(0.823)
0.740
(1.22)
(0.227)

-0.00106
(-1.14
(0.261)
0.0112
(1.57)
(0.122)
0.0160
(1.04)
(0.305)
0.368*
(1.79)
(0.080)
0.00573
(0.99)
(0.326)
-0.000829
(-1.18)
(0.242)
0.00669
(1.01)
(0.316)
-0.0116
(-1.21)
(0.234)
0.0000683
(0.09)
(0.926)
-1.050**
(-2.18)
(0.034)
-0.000140
(-0.28)
(0.777)
0.670
(1.10)
(0.275)
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N = 62
R^2 = 0.342
Adjusted R^2 = 0.197
Prob > F: 0.0195

N = 62
R^2 = 0.349
Adjusted R^2 = 0.206
Prob > F: 0.0162

Table 5. Extended Regressions of COOP_GDP and COOP_MEMB with LRP20:
Variable

COOP_GDP

COOP_MEMB

COOP_GDP

Coefficients
(t-value)
(p-value)
-0.012
(-1.59)
(0.119)
N/A

Coefficients
(t-value)
(p-value)
N/A

COOP_MEMB

NAT_RES

GDP_GROW

LGDPPC

UNEMP

TRAD_OPEN

INFL_CPI

GOV_EXP

FIN_DEV

LEDUC

0.00772
(1.25)
(0.217)
0.0154
(1.20)
(0.237)
0.321*
(1.87)
(0.067)
0.00413
(0.85)
(0.397)
-0.000964
(-1.60)
(0.115)
0.00652
(1.15)
(0.255)
-0.0119
(-1.38)
(0.173)
0.00000609
(0.01)
(0.992)
-0.897**
(-2.20)
(0.032)

-0.00111
(-1.38)
(0.173)
0.00883
(1.44)
(0.156)
0.0121
(0.93)
(0.355)
0.358*
(1.98)
(0.053)
0.00443
(0.91)
(0.365)
-0.00105*
(-1.71)
(0.093)
0.00661
(1.16)
(0.251)
-0.015*
(-1.81)
(0.076)
-0.000116
(-0.18)
(0.856)
-0.978**
(-2.35)
(0.023)
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FIN_OPEN

Constant

0.0000747
(0.18)
(0.861)
0.549
(1.06)
(0.293)
N = 62
R^2 = 0.428
Adjusted R^2 = 0.303
Prob > F: 0.0014

0.0000227
(0.05)
(0.957)
0.539
(1.03)
(0.310)
N = 62
R^2 = 0.422
Adjusted R^2 = 0.294
Prob > F: 0.0018

Conclusion and Policy Implications:
These results are fairly standard in comparison to other studies on income inequality. For
the extended regression of COOP_GDP on GINI, two of the ten standard determinants, not
including the two cooperative variables of interest, were statistically significant at the usual levels.
These variables were UNEMP and LEDUC. For the extended regression of COOP_MEMB on
GINI, three of the ten standard determinants were statistically significant: NAT_RES, UNEMP,
and LEDUC. There are numerous examples of academic papers on income inequality with models
that incorporate 10 or more independent variables where only a handful of the variables are
statistically significant. Therefore, I am not overly surprised or concerned by the lack of
statistically significant variables.
Although the two cooperative variables of primary interest are negatively associated with
income inequality, the statistical significance of the estimates is weak. This might be the result of
various factors. One possibility is that there is simply not enough data to capture the true
relationships between these variables. Many of the control variables do not return significant
results. This could be the result of having only 66 observations. Perhaps 66 observations are not
enough to make significant statements regarding the relationships between the core variables. A
final consideration is that perhaps income inequality is not an appropriate measure of interest, and
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rather wealth inequality is. Due to the worker-ownership aspect of worker-owned cooperatives,
perhaps prevalence of cooperatives will be correlated with lower wealth inequality. The problem
with performing analysis using wealth Gini data is that it is difficult to obtain the necessary data
for this variable. Income inequality data across countries is more abundant than wealth inequality
data.
The lack of statistically significant results, of course, implies that there are few policy
implications from this paper. It is interesting to note the significant relationship between education
and income inequality found in this study. Though there is a significant amount of literature on the
relationship between both natural resource endowment and unemployment rate on income
inequality, there seems to be relatively fewer cross-country studies that find a clear negative
relationship between education and income inequality. Therefore, these results may prove to be
important for policymakers interested in addressing income inequality through increased
education. Literature on the topic of cooperatives still provides ample evidence in support of the
promotion of cooperatives as a strategy to address a wide range of social and economic issues.
However, when it comes to addressing the issue of high income inequality, more standard
approaches might have to be utilized by governments even though promotion of cooperatives may
still be desirable for other reasons related to social and economic welfare.
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Appendix A. Data Sources and Related Information:

Variable
GINI

Data Source
World Bank
and
CIA World
Factbook

Web Address
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/S
I.POV.GINI;
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicati
ons/the-worldfactbook/fields/2172.html

Year(s)
2013 or
most recent
year
available

LRP10

U.N. Human
Development
Report 2009;
CIA World
Factbook;
and OECD
database

2009 or
most recent
year
available

LRP20

U.N. Human
Development
Report
2007/2008;
Mallis
(2015);
OECD
database; and
Mijatovic
(2015)

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/
reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.
pdf;
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicati
ons/the-worldfactbook/fields/2047.html;
https://data.oecd.org/inequality/inco
me-inequality.htm
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/
reports/268/hdr_20072008_en_co
mplete.pdf;
http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/mof.nsf/
All/525EB3E73120303EC2257DD5
002C51D0/$file/Income%20distribut
ion%20&%20Economic%20Growth
%20[Compatibility%20Mode].pdf;
https://data.oecd.org/inequality/inco
me-inequality.htm;
http://socijalnoukljucivanje.gov.rs/w
p-content/uploads/2015/10/Povertyin-Serbia-2014..pdf

COOP_GDP

2014 Global http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/docu
Census on
ments/2014/coopsegm/grace.pdf
Co-operatives **Special requested complete
dataset**
COOP_MEMB 2014 Global http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/docu
Census on
ments/2014/coopsegm/grace.pdf
Co-operatives **Special requested complete
dataset**

2007/2008
or most
recent year
available

2014

2014

34

NAT_RES

World Bank

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS

2014 (one
observation
from 2013)
2014

GDP_GROW

World Bank
and CIA
World
Factbook

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG;
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicati
ons/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2003rank.html

LGDPPC

World Bank
and CIA
World
Factbook

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD;
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicati
ons/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2004rank.html

UNEMP

World Bank

TRAD_OPEN

World Bank

INFL_CPI

World Bank
and CIA
World
Factbook

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/S 2014
L.UEM.TOTL.ZS
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ 2014 (one
NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS
observation
from 2010,
2011, 2012)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/F 2014
P.CPI.TOTL.ZG;
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicati
ons/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2092rank.html

GOV_EXP

World Bank
and Heritage
Foundation

FIN_DEV

World Bank

2014 (two
observation
s from
2015)

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NE.CON.GOVT.ZS;
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2
016/countries/srilanka.pdf

2014 (one
observation
from 2011,
2012, and
2016)
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/F 2014 (one
S.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS
observation
from 2006,
2008, 2009,
and 2010
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LEDUC

FIN_OPEN

U.N. Human
Development
Index
World Bank

http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HD 2014
I
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/F
M.AST.NFRG.CN?page=1;
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CN

2014 (one
observation
from 2006,
2008, 2009,
2010, and
2013)
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Appendix B. List of Countries and the Corresponding Gini Values:
Country
South Africa
Colombia
Brazil
Guatemala
Panama
Chile
Costa Rica
Kenya
Mexico
Ecuador
Dominican Republic
Barbados
Singapore
Malaysia
Peru
Macedonia (Former Yugoslav
Rep of)
Philippines
Israel
Argentina
China
Uruguay
Russian Federation
United States
Morocco
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
Thailand
Sri Lanka
Greece
New Zealand
Bulgaria
Portugal
Spain
Mauritius
Italy
Australia
Luxembourg
Cyprus

Income Gini
Coefficient (%)
63.4
53.5
52.9
52.4
51.7
50.5
49.2
48.5
48.1
47.3
47.1
47
46.4
46.3
44.7
44.1
43
42.8
42.3
42.1
41.9
41.6
41.1
40.7
40.3
40.2
39.3
38.6
36.7
36.2

36
36
35.9
35.8
35.2
34.9
34.8
34.3
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India
Mongolia
Canada
Estonia
France
United Kingdom
Ireland
Poland
Japan
Bangladesh
Croatia
Switzerland
Korea (Republic of)
Hungary
Austria
Germany
Serbia
Denmark
Netherlands
Malta
Romania
Sweden
Finland
Czech Republic
Slovak Republic
Norway
Slovenia
Ukraine

33.9
33.8
33.7
33.2
33.1
32.6
32.5
32.4
32.1
32
32
31.6
31.3

30.6
30.5
30.1
29.7
29.1
28
27.9
27.3
27.3
27.1
26.1
26.1
25.9
25.6
24.6
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